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ABSTRACT 
As Congress considers whether to renew, amend, or scuttle the 
Voting Rights Act, what relevant lessons can we draw from the 
historical record of the First (nineteenth century) Reconstruction and 
its undermining? The federal voting rights machinery, more 
sophisticated and stringent than is usually believed, represented an 
attempt, parallel to the VRA, to protect citizens' political rights. 
It was finally outflanked, as the VRA may be. The promises of 
southern leaders in the l870s, convincing to some credulous Yankees of 
the period, are also echoed in the debate a century later. 
There were four stages in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century attack on black voting rights: the Klan stage, the dilution 
stage, the disfranchisement stage, and the lily-white stage. 
Concentrating on the second and fourth of these, which are less well 
known than the other two, I detail sixteen mechanisms of nineteenth 
century southern vote dilution (most of which are still in use) and 
attempt to counter the argument that the so-called "Progressive Era" 
in the South was a "race-proof" period and that therefore any election 
schemes adopted at that time could not have been intended to 
disadvantage blacks. 
Finally, I draw parallels between Supreme Court decisions 
around the turn of the century and the recent decisions which climaxed 
with ~ v. Bolden. The possibility that the Supreme Court may 
again emasculate federal protection of black voting rights should give 
pause to any Congressperson who believes that he or she can safely let 
the VRA lapse because the courts can be relied upon to secure these 
rights. 
Written Testimony of Dr. J. Morgan Kousser, Professor of History and 
Social Science, California Institute of Technology, Prepared for 
Hearing on Renewal of the Voting Rights Act Before The Subcommittee 
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee, 
June 24, 1981 
TIIE UNDERHINING OF THE FIRST RECONSTRUCTION: 
LESSONS FOR TIIE SECOND 
It is not only historians who name eras, make analogies, draw 
lessons from the past. As the Selma March was approaching Montgomery, 
Alabama in 1965, and as Congress was pushing House Resolution 6400 
toward passage, the Montgomery Advertiser, sensing the strong national 
current, remarked "It is almost certain that President Johnson's 
reconstruction bill will be enacted."l The President Johnson referred 
to was not Andrew, but Lyndon, the "reconstruction" alluded to was not 
the first, but the second, and the bill was not the "Force lt or "Ku 
Klux" laws, but the Voting Rights Act. Currently up for renewal, the 
Voting Rights Act is under attack as anti-Southern, an infringement on 
2 
matters better left to state and local governments, and, most 
importantly, as unnecessary. It is therefore both desirable and safe, 
we are told, to dismantle at least this vestige of the Second 
Reconstruction. 
The fact that, despite the guarantee of racially impartial 
suffrage in the Fifteenth Amendment, blacks gradually lost the right 
to vote after the end of the First Reconstruction should caution 
policymakers against a second abandonment of national regulation of 
elections. But beyond this obvious parallel, what lessons for the 
present can be drawn from the earlier period? \fuat were the terms of 
the national suffrage guarantees passed by Congress in the 1860s and 
70s? \Vhat promises did Southern white leaders of a century ago make 
in an attempt to convince Northerners that black rights would be safe 
under "home rule" for Dixie? By what legal and extra-legal means was 
black political power diluted and blacks eventually almost totally 
disfranchised? How exact is the parallel, and, therefore, how 
relevant are the lessons? Have the conditions of blacks and the 
current and likely actions of whites changed so much that we have 
little to learn from history? 
I. THE FIRST FEDERAL VOTING RIGHTS HACHINERY 
During the first Reconstruction, the national government made 
two attempts by constitutional amendment and four attempts by law to 
protect black voting rights. Section two of the Fourteenth Amendment 
held out to the states the carrot of increased representation in 
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Congress if they would repeal laws or state constitutional provisions 
excluding blacks from the right of suffrage. Less than a year after 
that amendment's ratification, however, Congress passed the more 
explicit provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment, which absolutely 
precluded state or national authorities from denying -- or abridging 
-- the right of citizens to vote on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. The 40th Congress considered, but, 
after discussion, rejected broader versions of the Fifteenth Amendment 
which would have banned literacy and property tests and other similar 
devices. 2 
Yet Congress recognized that the Amendments, as well as the 
Military Reconstruction Acts which, even before the adoption of the 
Fifteenth Amendment, had enfranchised blacks in the seceeding states 
were not self-executing. To preclude official or unofficial violence, 
intimidation, or election irregularities from robbing citizens of any 
color of the right to vote and to have their ballots counted as cast, 
Congress in 1870 and 1871 passed the so-called Enforcement, Force, and 
Ku Klux Acts, and in 1890 considered, but shelved by one vote in the 
Senate, the Lodge Fair Elections Bill.3 Both the enforcement and Ku 
Klux Acts made interfering with the right of citizens to vote a 
federal crime, and the Force Act went farther, requiring federal 
courts, upon a petition from two resident citizens, to appoint federal 
officers to oversee the registration and election process in cities or 
towns containing 20,000 or more inhabitants. The Lodge Bill in 1890 
sought to extend the provisions of the Force Bill to all voters, rural 
as well as urban. 
II. NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTHERN WHITE PROHISES 
TO RESPECT BLACK VOTING RIGHTS 
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The first southern white response to threats of Reconstruction 
was defiance. 4 Believing that the Civil War had settled only the 
questions of secession and slavery, but that those who retained power 
in the states would be allowed to set the ~tatus of the freedmen 
approxinlately equal to that of the antebellum free people of color, 
white southerners virulently and often violently opposed all efforts 
to guarantee blacks equal rights, notably in the 1866 Civil Rights 
Bill, the Reconstruction Acts, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments, the various enforcement acts, and the 1875 Civil Rights 
Act. That the Republican majority, with substantial support from 
northern public opinion, continued for a time to insist on equal 
rights, however, convinced white southern Democrats to alter their 
tactics. While a ''white line" faction continued and even, in the 
mid-1870s, intensified the forcible intimidation of black voters, a 
more moderate "New Departure" faction of southern Democrats emerged at 
the same time, assuring northerners that black rights would be safe if 
federal protection were withdrawn. The left or moderate hand, the 
\-lade Hampton, L.Q.C. Lamar, and Francis T. Nicholls faction of the 
party, at least claimed not to know what the right or extreme racist 
hand, the Martin W. Gary and Ben Tillman faction, was doing. But the 
combined one-two punch was devastating to black political power in the 
Deep South. 
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The moderates' paper pledges were strong, and they persuaded 
those northerners who, like President Rutherford B. Hayes, were 
anxious to believe them. The Mississippi state Democratic platform of 
1875 affirmed a belief in "the civil and political equality of all men 
as established by the Constitution of the United States and the 
amendments thereto." In the words of the authoritative work on 
Hississippi Reconstruction, however, "the majority of the delegates 
did not take the document very seriously_,,5 Similarly, in Louisiana 
in 1876, in the words of the leading historical work on Reconstruction 
in that state, "The Democratic Platform also explicitly recognized the 
binding effect of the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the United 
States Constitution, and the party pledged itself to protect every 
citizen, regardless of race, in the exercise of his rights. Everyone 
of these pledges, except possibly the acknowledgement of the 13th 
Amendment, would be broken within a few years. 1I6 
In Virginia in 1873, the state Democratic party platform, 
again according to the standard scholarly monograph on the subject, 
"promised to administer equal justice to both races." Nevertheless, 
the Democrats, including even moderate gubernatorial candidate James 
L. Kemper, "made much of the color line" during that campaign, and, as 
we shall see below, the Virginians took action in the 1874 and 1876 
legislative sessions to reduce the black vote. 7 
In South Carolina, which had the largest black percentage of 
any state in the union at the time, the 1876 Democratic state platfornl 
announced: "We declare our acceptance, in perfect good faith, of the 
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the Federal 
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Constitution." The South's best known modf!rate Redeemer, South 
Carolina gubernatorial candidate Wade Hampton, promised repeatedly 
that "not one single right enjoyed by the colored people today shall 
be taken from them. They shall be the equals, under the law, of any 
man in South Carolina." Blacks would soon convert to the Democratic 
party, Hampton prophesied, "because they will find that their rights 
will be better protected by that party.IIB 
Hany observers at the time recognized the cynicism which 
involved in such pledges and prognostications. As Amos Akerman, who 
had returned to the South after serving briefly as Attorney-General 
under Grant, remarked at the time, "when speaking for effect at the 
North" the southern Democrats "say much about accepting the results of 
the war in good faith, and respecting the rights of everybody," but 
contradicted those statements by their "drastic policy and unguarded 
-utterances" in the South. 9 Even the oft-mentioned moderate policy of 
appointing blacks to some offices was mostly window-dressing. As Gov. 
Francis T. Nicholls of Louisiana, one of the most prominent New 
Departure Democrats, noted: "[I] appointed a number of [blacks] to 
small offices sandwiching them on Boards between white men where • 
they were powerless to do harm." l0 
The southern Democrats' promises had been, in fact, violated 
even as they were uttered. As U.S. Senate investigations in 1877 and 
1878 documented, widespread Ku Klux and Red Shirt violence kept many 
blacks from the polls, racially discriminatory voting restrictions and 
facially neutral laws administered in a discriminatory fashion 
discouraged others, and blatant ballot box stuffing and fraudulent 
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counting negated the votes of many who managed to overcome other 
obstacles to voting. l1 By 1880, even President Rutherford B. Hayes, 
whose southern policy was built on the assumption that white moderates 
would live up to their promises, hold the more openly racist whites in 
check, and join a Whiggish alliance with Republicans, recognized the 
southern violations and asked Congress to pass more legislation to 
protect black rights effectively.12 
III. FOUR STAGES IN THE ATTACK ON BLACK VOTING RIGHTS 
AFTER THE FIRST RECONSTRUCTION 
There were four overlapping stages, four sets of distinct 
tactics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century attacks on 
black voting rights: the Klan stage, the dilution stage, the 
disfranchisement stage, and the lily-white stage. In the first era, 
which is the best known, the basic tactics were violence, 
intimidation, and fraud. These methods continued to be used in later 
periods, as they were needed, to reinforce other, subtler devices, and 
the fact that they were always available itself often deterred blacks 
from organizing challenges to white political domination. Coordinated 
and deftly targeted white violence and fraud in the South from 1870 to 
1876 gradually overthrew every southern Republican government. 
Huch less well known or understood, the second or "dilution" 
phase was much more subtle. It aimed at reducing the threat of black 
political power efficaciously but quietly, so as to decrease the 
possibility that the national government would again intervene to 
protect black from white southerners. 
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The third or "disfranchisement" phase is familiar to every 
student of the South. Beginning as early as the 1870s and culminating 
in the constitutional conventions from 1890 on, white Democrats passed 
literacy and property tests and poll taxes with the expressed intent 
and demonstrated effect of disfranchising the vast majority of blacks. 
Though they provided loopholes for poor or illiterate whites -- the 
grandfather and "fighting grandfather" clauses and the "understanding" 
clause -- they also meant to and did disfranchise large numbers of 
l~ler-status white people. Nonetheless, the prime object of all these 
attacks on universal or impartial suffrage was the black man. 13 
The final or "lily white" stage generally succeeded 
disfranchisement of most blacks. Its aim was to crush any elevation 
of blacks above the distinctly secondary political status into which 
the disfranchisement measures had forced them, and to reduce, from 
very slim to none, any chances of blacks being elected or appointed to 
office or exercising any political muscle whatsoever. Some blacks 
remained on the voter rolls even after the turn of the century 
constitutions and amendments went into effect, and had the 
registration procedures been at all fair, many more could have 
registered. According to the U.S. Census of 1900, for instance, close 
to half of the adult black males in the South were literate, and 
others were direct descendants either of whites or of the more than 
200,000 blacks who had served in the Civil War or earlier wars. 
Republican and even Democratic administrations in the late nineteenth 
century had appointed blacks to federal offices -- postmasterships, 
tariff and other tax collection posts, as well as many positions in 
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the justice system. Yet during the so-called "Progressive Era," white 
southern politicians considered the prospect of any black at or near 
an office of responsibility as an impudent and intolerable attack on 
the newly established racial status quo, and they tried to insure, 
through further "reforms" of local government, that never again could 
a black be elected to even a minor office within the South. 14 
IV. NINETEENTH CENTURY DILUTION OF BLACK POLITICAL POWER --
LESSONS FOR THE 1980s 
Black economic status is sufficiently secure and national 
public opinion committed enough to racially impartial suffrage in the 
1980s that it is improbable to expect a return to the days when 
widespread violence, intimidation, or fraud, literacy tests, or poll 
taxes could be reimposed in order to deny black voting rights 
altogether. Nevertheless, more sophisticated means of abridging black 
political power are presently in use in numerous areas, and, if the 
pre-clearance provisions of Section Five of the Voting Rights Act are 
repealed, such means might well be employed much more in the future 
than they are today. But the abridgement as well as the denial of 
impartial suffrage is against the Fifteenth Amendment, and subtle as 
well as blatant discrimination can undermine the effective exercise of 
citizens' rights. It is therefore appropriate to take a closer look 
at the historical record in the two less well known of the four 
stages, particularly at the second stage. By what means was black 
political power diluted in the post-Reconstruction South? 
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Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction southern Democrats used 
at least sixteen different techniques to hamper black political power 
without actually denying the franchise to sufficient numbers of voters 
to invite a strengthening of federal intervention. l-lany of these 
devices were facially neutral and might possibly be upheld by courts 
even today. Indeed, some of them, adopted as long as a century ago, 
are still in effect and have recently been ruled not to violate the 
Constitution or laws of the United States. IS Thus, by looking at the 
past, we see also a possible future, a future which may well come 
about if continuous federal supervision of election practices is 
withdrawn from areas where racial bloc voting is still prevalent, a 
future of relatively subtle, but nonetheless effective racially 
discriminatory electoral procedures. 
Although they all had the same purpose -- the minimization of 
officeholding by black or black-influenced white officeholders -- the 
specific schemes varied because of differences in the black percentage 
of the popUlation and its geographic distribution. If the blacks were 
geographically concentrated within the politically relevant area, 
judicious gerrymandering could minimize the number of seats they could 
hope to win, but single-member districts, always preferred by most 
whites, could be maintained. 16 If Afro-Americans were in the 
minority, at-large elections could deny them any representation at 
all, especially when combined with white priumries, which minimized 
defections by disgruntled white factions in the general elections. If 
they had clear, but not substantial majorities, registration acts, 
poll taxes, secret ballot or multiple-box laws, or petty crimes 
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provisions could cut those majorities down, so that the previously 
mentioned tactics could be used. For temporarily white-controlled 
cities in such binds, annexation, or, in suitable circumstances, the 
strikingly inventive device of de-annexation or retrocession of 
territory were available. If the majorities were too large to be 
overcome, ~ for officeholders could be set so high as to deter any 
but the extremely affluent or those with rich friends from running, or 
the authorities might arbitrarily refuse to accept the bonds as valid, 
or election officials might consolidate polling places to such an 
extent as to make the trip to the polls or the line at the polls 
intolerably long, or they might just fail to open the polls 
altogether. In extremes, the legislatures could impeach or otherwise 
displace elected officials or do away with local elections altogether 
and vest the power to choose local officials in the legislature or 
governor or their appointees. Since many areas still lack detailed 
political histories, this list, and historians' current knowledge of 
the incidence of all these practices, are necessarily incomplete. 
Nonetheless, some illustrations are useful to lend concreteness to the 
catalogue. 
Racially motivated gerrymandering was widely employed in 
cities as well as states, for legislatures as well as Congress. 
Whereas more than sixty percent of South Carolina's people were black 
in the 1880s, only one of her seven Congressional districts had a 
secure black majority. Known at the time as the "black district,1I the 
South Carolina Seventh sliced through county lines and ducked around 
Charleston back alleys picking up every possible black, while avoiding 
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as many whites as it could; was contiguous at one point only by 
considering the Atlantic Ocean a land mass; contained nearly a third 
more people than another of the state's districts; and was shaped, the 
New York Times said, like a boa constrictor, the color of its intended 
victim clear. 17 Similarly, partisan and racial considerations -- the 
two correlated almost perfectly in the Deep South at the time -- gave 
North Carolina its "Black Second" Congressional District, Alabama its 
"Black Fourth," and Mississippi its notorious "Shoestring District," 
which tracked the Mississippi River down the whole length of the state 
in order to concentrate as much of the Negro vote as possible in one 
seat. 18 In the Texas legislature, the boundaries of all the black belt 
multi-county "floater" districts, in the words of the standard work on 
race relations in that state, "were gerrymandered in order to create a 
1 . .." 19 wute maJorl.ty. Similar racially tainted gerrymanders "whitened" 
state legislatures all across the South, as well as in the cities of 
Richmond, Nashville, Hontgomery, Raleigh, Chattanooga, Jackson 
(Hississippi), and doubtless others which have not yet received 
20 intensive study. 
At-large city elections, clearly motivated by racial purposes, 
appeared in the South as early as the first elections in which blacks 
were allowed to vote. "To guard against the possibility of the 
election of black city officials," white Atlanta Democrats in 1868 
"secured from the legislature the general ticket system.,,21 Two years 
later, after a temporarily Republican Georgia legislature restored the 
ward system, two of the ten candidates elected were black. But when 
the G.O.P. lost control of the legislature in 1871, the Democrats went 
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back to the at-large system, and no more blacks were elected to the 
Atlanta city government until 1953.22 In Mobile, Alabama, as research 
for the recent retrials in the Brown and Bolden cases has shown, the 
rabidly racist 1874 and 1876 Redeemer legislatures mandated .explicit 
at-large systems for the election of school board and city government 
officials. In the case of the school board, this replaced a system 
which had been designed to guarantee "minority representation," and in 
the instance of the city government, it was a substitute for a vague 
1870 law which a local racist faction of white Republicans had 
interpreted, under Democratic pressure, to require at-large elections. 
No black has ever been elected to either governmental body under an 
at-large system, which persists in Alabama law to this day.23 
Chattanooga, Hemphis, and Nashville "reformers," too, introduced and 
at times succeeded in getting the Tennessee legislature to pass at-
large election statutes for their cities. "Their efforts stemmed from 
partisan and racial motives," says the leading authority on the 
subject, who titles his chapter on the topic: "Urban Reform: The 
Nemesis of Black Power.,,24 
The Democratic primary was not at first principally a 
disfranchising device, for the vast majority of blacks wished only to 
cast Republican or independent votes and have them counted as cast, 
and, in fact, a few blacks were often allowed to vote in such 
primaries, in return for pledges of allegiance to the Democrats, in 
order to cut down the Republican totals in the general elections. But 
the local primary soon became the real election in many areas, and it 
was restricted to whites only in certain Texas counties from 1874 on, 
14 
in Edgefield and Charleston counties in South Carolina from 1878 on, 
in Birmingham from 1888 on, and in Atlanta for various periods before 
1895 and from that date until at least the Smith v. Allright decision 
in 1944.25 
By lengthening residency requirements, by requiring periodic 
voter registration at centrally located places during working hours 
and presentation of registration receipts at the polls (which burdened 
lower-class voters who were not accustomed, in those pre-bureaucratic 
days, to keeping records), by demanding copiously detailed 
information, which sometimes had to be vouched for by witnesses, 
before a voter could register, by allowing registration boards 
sufficient discretion to enable them to pad or unfairly to purge the 
rolls, by not guaranteeing equal party representation on such boards, 
and by permitting widespread challenges to voters at the polls, 
nineteenth century southern Democrats could keep the black vote under 
control. 
Speaking for local Democrats in February 1875, for instance, 
the Hontgomery Daily Advertiser pleaded that lIif the Legislature does 
not come to the aid of the negro [sic] dominated communities then 
there is no help for this portion of Alabama." The legislature 
d d . h . I I . . I 26 respon e w~t a strlct oca reglstratlon aw. In Mississippi in 
the same year, according to a leading modern scholar, "the new 
registration law provided an excellent means for local Democrats to 
reduce Negro voters to a manageable proportion -- an opportunity many 
seized upon immediately.,,27 Texas in 1874 gave city councils the 
right to delete "ineligibles" from the rolls after the close of 
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registration, a measure "undoubtedly motivated," in the words of 
Lawrence D. Rice, "by the mobility of certain portions of the 
. .. ,,28 . . 1 popu1at~on -- pr~nc~pally the Negroes. In Tennessee, a mun~c~pa 
registration act was beaten in 1885 only when the Republicaps in the 
state senate walked out, breaking the quorum. When it passed, along 
with a secret ballot act (which served as a de facto literacy test, 
since illiterates were not allowed assistance in voting) in 1889, 
registration devastated the black vote in the four major Tennessee 
. . . . d d 29 c~t~es, as ~t was ~nten e to. 
The South Carolina registration and eight-box law was one of 
the most clever strategems, and its provisions illustrate better than 
any other instance how ingenious southern authors could twist 
seemingly neutral devices for partisan and racist purposes. As first 
introduced, the bill took the "neutral principle" of voter 
registration and turned it into a literacy test by requiring potential 
registrants to sign their names. Its author, the "patrician" Edward 
McCrady, Jr., estimated that this would disfranchise a majority of the 
blacks. To those who pointed out that a literacy test would also 
affect many whites, McCrady proposed as an escape mechanism the first 
form of the grandfather clause. Massachusetts in 1857 had required 
literacy of all future voters, but allowed those already on the rolls 
to stay. McCrady simply adopted the principle of the Massachusetts 
provision, along with its 1857 date, which, as everyone realized, 
predated black suffrage. As the bill finally passed, the literacy 
test was shifted into a new section of the law which provided for 
separate ballot boxes for each of eight offices, required election 
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officials to shift the boxes around during the voting to make it 
impossible for a literate friend to put an illiterate's tickets in the 
correct order before he entered the polling place, and prohibited 
anyone but the election officers (all but one or two of whom in the 
entire state seem to have been Democrats) from assisting unlettered 
voters. In place of the grandfather clause, the registration 
provision which finally passed allowed the registrar at the close of 
the registration period to add to the list any voter who had failed to 
register if the official, to quote the law, "upon such evidence as he 
may think necessary, in his discretion" judged that the voter should 
be on the rolls. This open invitation to fraud and discrimination was 
designed to let registrars enfranchise all whites. Black turnout in 
South Carolina in the Presidential election of 1884 dropped by an 
estimated 50 percent from its 1880 level.30 
Although some scholars have doubted the effect of the poll tax 
on black voting, contemporaries knew better. It was "the most 
effective instrumentality of Negro disfranchisement," according to a 
member of the 1890 Mississippi Constitutional Convention's Franchise 
Committee, and "practically disfranchised the Negroes" in Georgia, 
according to a prominent North Carolina disfranchiser. And it was 
adopted early in some states. Georgia Republicans suspended the tax 
as a suffrage prerequisite in 1870, but the Democratic Redeemer 
legislature promptly restored it in 1871, and the 1877 Georgia 
Constitutional Convention not only fixed it in the fundamental law, 
but made it cumulative -- i.e., taxes for all previous years had to be 
paid before one could vote. Tennessee Denlocrats in 1870 and Virginia 
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Democrats in 1876 followed Georgia's lead, but anti-Democratic 
"independent" movements J which were allied with the heavily black 
Republican parties in each state, made poll tax repeal one of their 
first orders of business during the 1870s. As is well known, by 1908, 
all southern states had made the poll tax a suffrage prerequisite, and 
the Afro-American was always its chief intended victim. 31 
Less well known were laws and constitutional provisions 
disfranchising people for having committed various crimes. While the 
effect of such provisions is unclear, since many were apparently 
adopted primarily as insurance if courts struck down more blatantly 
unconstitutional clauses or mandated fair implementation of those 
clauses, their intent is obvious. According to the Richmond State and 
the Petersburg Index and Appeal, Virginia's petty crimes provision, 
along with the poll tax, effected "almost • • • a political 
revolution" in cutting down the black vote. 32 lo1ississippi's infamous 
1875 "pig law" defined the theft of property valued at ten dollars or 
more~ or of any cattle or swine, whatever their value, as grand 
larceny, thus bringing those convicted of such minor offenses under 
h · . . 1 ff b 33 . db' t e prev~ous state const~tut~ona su rage an. Dur~ng e ate 1n the 
1895 South Carolina Constitutional Convention, a delegate moved to add 
to the list of disfranchising crimes housebreaking, receiving stolen 
goods, breach of trust with a fraudulent intention, fornication, 
sodomy, assault with intent to ravish, miscegenation, incest, and 
larceny, and to strike out theft and the middle-class crime of 
embezzlement. The conventioneers agreed, as they did to another 
member's proposal to include wife-beating. Hurderers, however, were 
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allowed to vote.34 The framer of the crimes provision in the Alabama 
Constitutional Convention of 1901 thought that its wife-beating 
provision alone would disqualify sixty percent of the black males.35 
Recent attempts to have the South Carolina and Alabama petty crimes 
. . d .. h f' d' f 1 36 prov~s~ons declare unconst~tut~onal ave a~le ~n edera courts. 
To reduce a black majority in 1877, Montgomery de-annexed a 
predominately black section, even though the area contained enough 
valuable industrial property that its retrocession noticeably reduced 
h ., b 37 t e c~ty s tax ase. 
To discourage black candidates, the town of Huntsville, Texas, 
raised the required bond for constables during the 1880s to twenty 
thousand dollars. 38 In Vance County, North Carolina, in 1887, a 
sheriff's bond was fixed at fifty-three thousand dollars and a 
treasurer's, at eighteen thousand dollars* Since few Republicans were 
wealthy enough to sign such bonds, only those acceptable to rich 
Democrats could serve. Even if they had affluent friends, successful 
candidates sometimes had their bonds arbitrarily refused by the 
Democratically-appointed county commissioners in North Carolina. In 
Warren County in 1886, the commissioners turned down a candidate, 
because he "was a colored man." His white opponent, rejected by the 
voters, was given the the office. 39 
Fraud, notorious and ubiquitous in the postbellum South, was 
supplemented by somewhat less blatant polling place irregularities, 
which are best illustrated by one scholar's description of the 1876 
election in the Alabama black belt: "On election day some polls 
opened and closed at the whim of election officials while other polls 
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moved several times during the day. Some election officials refused 
to open the polls at all, and others announced that they were not 
going to remain at the polls all day to permit blacks to make 'radical 
majorities.' The failure to open polls in Republican strongholds in 
Hale, Perry, ~~rengo, Bullock, Barbour, Greene, Pickens, Wilcox, and 
Sumter counties undermined Republican strength as effectively as the 
earlier terror of the Ku Klux Klan, and it involved no bloodshed. 1I40 
If all else failed, officials could be impeached or forced 
from office, often on trumped-up charges, and local governments could 
be made appointive. Thus, North Carolina Governor William W. Holden 
was impeached in 1870 for trying to put down the Klan, and Mississippi 
Governor Adelbert Ames, whom no one credibly charged with any illegal 
act, was pressured out of office during impeachment proceedings, which 
also led to resignations by other statewide executive and judicial 
officials, as well as circuit judges, in that state and in South 
Carolina. 41 In Tennessee in 1869 and in Virginia in 1870, 
conservative state legislatures summarily ousted the Nashville and 
Richmond city governments and replaced Republicans with Democrats. 
The Alabama legislature abolished the Dallas county criminal court 
because the black Republican judge refused to resign, and did away 
with the elective office of county commissioner in at least five black 
belt counties during the 1870s, substituting gubernatorily appointed 
officers. The purpose of Alabama's action was later openly avowed by 
state legislator James Jefferson Robinson: 
"Nontgomery county came before us and asked us to give them 
protection of life, liberty and property by abolishing the 
20 
offices that the electors in that county had elected. Dallas 
asked us to strike down the officials they had elected in that 
county, one of them a Negro that had the right to try a white man 
for his life, liberty and property. Mr. Chairman, that was a 
grave question to the Democrats who had always believed in the 
right of the people to select their own officers, but when we saw 
the life, liberty and property of the Caucasians were at stake, 
we struck down in Dallas county the Negro and his cohor~~. We 
put men of the Caucasian race there to try them • • • " 
In North Carolina, the state legislature first divested the voters of 
the right to elect county commissioners and justices of the peace, 
then arrogated to itself the power to name justices of the peace, then 
gave the justices of the peace the responsibility of choosing the 
commissioners. The complexion of county government in Wake and other 
Republican counties changed immediately and irredeemably.43 
What policy conclusions can we draw from this review of the 
nineteenth century dilution phase? First, since as every politician 
knows, politics is oten a matter of small margins and any change in 
the rules can potentially make a large difference in outcomes, it 
follows that even minor alterations in election structures can be 
extremely important. Many of the nineteenth century dilutive devices 
had no impact or only a marginal impact on blacks' ability to vote ~ 
~, but they very often made the difference between winning and losing 
that is to say, between having some political influence and little 
or none. Second, many of the schemes were ingenious and their exact 
form could not have readily been predicted in advance. Any attempt to 
prohibit discriminatory voting devices must have built into it 
sufficient administrative flexibility to be able to deal ,-lith schemes 
which cannot all be precisely anticipated. Third, many of the means 
of abridgement depended largely on discriminatory administration of 
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seemingly fair laws. Since such practices are particularly difficult 
for courts to evaluate, and since litigation tends to drag on for many 
years, perhaps allowing the discrimination to continue while lawyers 
delay and judges make up their minds, it is preferable to vest 
oversight power in an executive administrative agency, if one really 
wants to prohibit this type of discrimination. Fourth, many of the 
existing practices and structures which were in effect ~randfathered 
in, at least by the current legal interpretation of section two, by 
the Voting Rights Act were adopted as long as a century ago for 
purposes which historians would probably be willing to conclude were 
discriminatory. Although it is difficult and extremely time-consuming 
to uncover evidence of their exact intent which would convince an 
unsympathetic judge, and nearly impossible to find guns still merrily 
smoking after so long a time, it is possible to discover quite a lot 
about motives in many instances. If Congress really wishes to 
guarantee fair and effective suffrage for "discrete and insular 
minorities," it ought to consider removing its own 1965 grandfather 
clause from practices which clearly have the effect of disadvantaging 
such people, and which in the instances which have been most closely 
studied so far have been shown to have been enacted with 
discriminatory purposes in mind. 
V. MUNICIPAL "REFORH" AND THE LILY-WHITE STAGE 
In his plurality opinion in Hobile v. Bolden, Hr. Justice 
Stewart contends that "It is noteworthy that a system of at-large city 
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elections in place of elections of city officials by the voters of 
small geographic wards was universally heralded not many years ago as 
a praiseworthy and progressive reform of corrupt municipal 
government." In support of this view, Justice Stewart cites only one 
pertinent source, Banfield and Wilson's City Politics, blatantly 
misreads the relevant sentence on the page he cites, and fails to note 
that Banfield and Wilson elsewhere in the book devote a full page to 
the deleterious effect of at-large systems on black representation.44 
Moreover, Justice Stewart's summary is at least a generation out of 
date, and the view he expresses no longer commands the respect of the 
community of professional historians, if it ever did. In the nation 
as a whole, it is clear that comnlission government and at-large 
elections had as one of their prime purposes the strengthening of 
upper-class influence and the corresponding weakening of lower-class 
influence in politics. In the South, a large part of that lower-class 
was black. Municipal reform in the region was often part and parcel 
of the movement to insure that government would remain lily-white. 
The recent historiography of municipal political reform during 
the early part of the twentieth century has been dominated by the so-
called "Weinstein-Hays Thesis." In seminal articles in 1962 and 1964, 
James Weinstein and Samuel P. Hays examined the social origins and 
consequences of the city commission and manager movements. Their 
conclusions, now widely accepted by historians, were summarized by 
Weinstein: 
II ••• the heart of the [commission] plan} that of electing only 
a few men on a citywide vote, made election of minority or labor 
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candidates more difficult and less likely. Before the widespread 
adoption of commission and manager government it was common foro 
workingmen to enter politics and serve as aldermen, or even mayor 
• • • But once the commission plan was in effect this became 
rare. Working-class aldermen were hard hit because the resources 
needed to conduct a citywide campaigOn were much greater than 
those needed for a ward election, and because minorities --
political, racial, or national -- were usually concentrated in 
specific wards ••• The nonpartisan ballot, a feature of most 
commission-manager plans and widely heralded as a great advance 
in democracy, also tended to operate against minority groups •• 
• • The end result of the movements was to ~!ace city government 
firmly in the hands of the business-class." 
Hays' description of the origins of the municipal reform movement 
makes clear that these consequences were foreseen and intended: "The 
movement for reform in municipal government, therefore, constituted an 
attempt by upper-class, advanced professional, and large-business 
groups to take formal political power from the previously dominant 
lower- and middle-class elements so that they might advance their own 
conceptions of desirable public policy.1I46 
Historical works written since the Weinstein and Hays articles 
have broadened and deepened their research, but have left their 
conclusions essentially unchanged. In Galveston, fount of the 
twentieth century commission idea, businessmen led the drive for both 
at-large elections (which preceded commission government in that city) 
and the abolition of the mayor-council structure. But the movement 
was damaging to blacks, as Bradley Rice notes in his recent book: "As 
some black leaders had anticipated, the at-large feature of the 1895 
charter effectively terminated Negro office-holding in Galveston 
despite the fact the race comprised twenty-two percent of the city's 
popUlation in 1900. The black incombent whom the People's Ticket 
endorsed carried his district but fell victim to city-wide prejudice 
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in the total vote.,,47 All across the nation, Rice finds, minority and 
lower-status groups opposed at-large during this era: "The lower 
classes correctly perceived that the at-large election of a small 
board would make it difficult for people of limited means to be 
elected. They expected that governmental schemes devised and promoted 
by business interests would be run for the benefit of those same 
interests.,,48 Appealing for black votes against the commission in Des 
Hoines, Iowa, in 1908, for instance, an orator told the Trades and 
Labor Assembly that "This is the Galveston system pure and simple to 
keep the so-called white trash and the colored vote of the south from 
exerting itself in participation of [sic] the affairs of the city. ,,49 
But why, after the passage of constitutional disfranchisement 
measures had devastated the black vote in the South, was further 
"reform" necessary? Whatever the impetus of "reform" electoral 
structures elsewhere in the nation or before "hard" suffrage 
restriction laws went into effect in the South, weren't most of the 
post-l900 changes passed in "race-proof" situations? To understand 
why the implications of this question are misleading requires a deeper 
look at both disfranchisement and at the lily-white "progressive" 
impulse. 
Never after the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment were all 
southern blacks disfranchised. In every state, and particularly in 
southern cities, where the literate, and, relative to sharecroppers, 
comparatively wealthy black middle-class congregated, thousands of 
Afro-Americans remained on the voting rolls. 50 In close elections, 
especially in the often desultory municipal election contests, 
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geographically concentrated minority votes might hold the balance of 
power. In Nobile in 1908, for instance, nearly 200 blacks were 
registered, in an era when the normal turnout was about 3,000 in 
municipal campaigns, and when the legislature temporarily shifted to a 
scheme in which the members of one part of the bicameral city 
governing body would be selected on a ward basis, there was a real 
fear that blacks might influence the selection of a member from one or 
two wards. The answer to this threat was first, to ban blacks 
altogether from the local Democratic primary -- some had previously 
been allowed to vote, and others then apparently desired to -- and 
second, to return to totally at-large elections, which the legislature 
ordered in 1911. 
In fact, throughout the South, whites in the "progressive era" 
feared that their "solution" to the "Negro problem" might unravel. To 
counter the possibility that blacks might be able to take advantage of 
splits within the white community, the Democrats sought to impede the 
growth of any potential opposition party by legalizing the direct 
primary and banning defeated primary candidates from running in the 
general election. All White, they hoped, would come to consider the 
primary the real election, and organized party opposition would fade. 
As we know, the scheme succeeded. Increasingly completely excluded 
from what became known at that time as the "white primary," blacks 
could thereafter no longer cherish even the slightest hope that they 
could ally with a disgruntled white faction or party and thereby 
regain some political influence. 51 
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Two famous incidents underscore the extent to which 
southerners in the early part of this century insisted upon absolutely 
lily-white government, help us understand the pervasiveness and depth 
of racial motives, the lengths to which white southerners of the time 
were willing to go to eliminate even the least vestige of black 
political power, and therefore the improbability that any political 
change which affected blacks could have been devoid of a racial 
purpose. 
The first incident involved Hrs. Hinnie Cox, who had been 
postmistress at Indianola, Mississippi, during the Harrison and 
McKinley administrations and had been continued in her job when 
McKinley's assassination brought Theodore Roosevelt to the Presidency. 
Wealthy and college-educated, Mrs. Cox was widely respected in the 
white community in Sunflower County, and there was never any question 
of her competence or probity. In 1902, however, a complicated series 
of maneuvers by opportunistic local, state, and national politicians 
led to such loud demands for her replacement that the unoffending 
third-class post-mistress in the tiny Mississippi town became the 
subject of numerous editorials in national newspapers, cabinet 
meetings, a u.s. Senate debate, and a formal Congressional 
investigation! Hrs. Cox was eventually replaced by a white man. 52 
In the second black cause celebre of the Theodore Roosevelt 
administration, the U.S. Senate, responding to southern white 
protests, held up for two years, solely on racial grounds, the 
appointment of an affluent, college-educated black doctor, William D. 
Crum, for the collectorship of the Port of Charleston. The prolonged 
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struggle and agitation over the issue of appointing an Afro-American 
to this comparatively unimportant post was enough to win Roosevelt the 
virtually unaminous support of Negroes throughout the country at the 
same time that it scotched any hopes the President, previously 
immensely popular in the South, had for reviving the Republican party 
in the region. 53 
Along with the Cox affair, the Crum controversy makes clear 
the heavy burden borne by present-day defenders of laws originally 
passed in the lily-white era and still in force today, if they claim 
that those laws were passed without discriminatory intent. Would 
people who had been about the job of manipulating electoral structures 
to reduce black influence for over a generation, people who would 
openly and repeatedly defy a charismatic President in an attempt to 
keep political offices pure white be likely to have been unconscious 
that one of the most widely noted effects of a particular change in 
the political rules, such as a shift from ward to at-large elections, 
would be to make it virtually impossible for the foreseeable future to 
elect a black to office? I find this "race-proof situation" argument 
completely implausible, and hope that Congress will take into account 
that period's overwhelming racism and the persistence of political 
structures dating from that time, which still often hinder blacks in 
the full exercise of their franchise, in considering what practices 
are to be forbidden and what administrative mechanisms are to be 
established or maintained under the Voting Rights Act. 
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VI. THE SUPRE~1E COURT THEN AND NOW 
Sanguine nineteenth century supporters of black rights 
sometimes contented themselves after Reconstruction with the idea that 
the constitutional protections of those rights would be enforced by 
the courts, even if Congress and the states reneged. That those hopes 
proved ill-founded by the turn of the century is well known. And the 
parallels between past and current judicial language and decisions are 
close enough to give pause to any who would offer as alibis for 
inaction or timid action on renewal of the Voting Rights Act the 
excuse that the courts will still be around to protect constitutional 
rights. 
The Supreme Court's retreat in such major cases as Slaughter 
House, The Civil Rights Cases, and Plessy v. Ferguson is common 
textbook knowledge. Rather less widely known, often mistakenly 
interpreted, and more closely analogous to more recent decisions is 
the Court's series of turn-of-the-century opinions on black voting 
rights and the intent to discriminate. 
In Yick ~lo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), an attorney for 
Chinese laundrymen in San Francisco had presented an extensive factual 
brief detailing both the open avowal of an intent to disadvantage 
Chinese laundrymen during the San Francisco Board of Supervisors' 
debate over adoption of the facially neutral ordinance at issue, and 
the discriminatory effect on the Chinese of the ordinance as 
administered. In a rather expansive opinion, parts of which it later 
in effect declared dicta, the Supreme Court found an equal protection 
violation. Reading Yick v10 too broadly, Cornelius J. Jones, a clever 
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but inexperienced black lawyer from Greenville, Hississippi, 
challenged a client's murder conviction on the grounds that the jury 
panel had been drawn from the voting rolls, from which blacks had been 
effectively excluded by the 1890 Nississippi constitution. Quoting 
extensively from newspaper reports of the debates at the Mississippi 
disfranchising convention, but offering no direct evidence of the 
notorious fact that the intent of the delegates had been carried out, 
Jones asked the Court to declare the Mississippi voting rules 
unconstitutional and to let his client go free. 54 The Court easily 
sidestepped Jones, declaring that proof of intent was insufficient, 
55 that one had to prove effect as well. 
In the next case after the Williams debacle, a more savvy 
black lawyer, Wilford H. Smith of New York, was secretly hired by 
Booker T. Washington essentially to plug the loopholes in Jones' case. 
Challenging the 1901 Alabama Constitution's suffrage provisions 
directly, Smith's brief charged that the state constitution's 
"fighting grandfather" clause was a blatant attempt to subvert the 
Fifteenth Amendment, that the debates provided plentiful evidence that 
the whole scheme was designed to disfranchise blacks both through 
provisions which the delegates knew would have a disproportionate 
lllpact upon them and through pre-planned discrimination in the 
administration of provisions which appeared neutral on their face, and 
finally, that the plot had been carried out, since Mr. Giles and other 
literate Negroes had been denied the right to register. 56 Since it 
could no longer use the impact/intent ploy, the Court turned to 
another classic dodge in the equal protection game, the question of 
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relief. Smith had contended that the suffrage provisions of the 
Alabama constitution were so tainted with racist intent that the Court 
should declare the whole package unconstitutional, but also that it 
should order the Hontgomery registrar to add Hr. Giles to the rolls. 
But, responded Nr. Justic Holmes, suppose the Court attacked 
administrative discrimination by ordering Giles and other literate 
blacks registered, but left the suffrage provisions otherwise intact. 
Wouldn't the discrimination complained of still persist for most 
Negroes? Conversely, suppose the Court threw out the provisions 
altogether. Then if it ordered Giles registered, the Court would 
become a party to a purportedly unlawful scheme. Anyway, Holmes 
concluded, grasping either horn of the dilemma would involve the 
courts too deeply in "political questions," which were best left to 
Congress and the state legislatures. It was a constitutional 
violation which the judiciary could not relieve. 
Interestingly enough, Congress was considering the same 
question simultaneously. At the same time that he brought the 
Williams case in court, Cornelius J. Jones had challenged the seating 
of three Congressmen from Hississippi before the quasi-judicial House 
Elections Comnlittee on the grounds that blacks had been 
unconstitutionally excluded from the electorate and that therefore the 
elections were illegal~. While he had not presented a full-
fledged case, other lawyers who followed Jones' lead later did, and 
the committee had put off ruling on the issue until the Dantzler 
challenge from South Carolina in 1903. In that case, decided within 
six months of Giles, the House Committee invoked what might be called, 
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in analogy to the "political questions" doctrine, a "judicial 
questions" doctrine, ruling that such charges of discrimination were 
best left to the courts. The Alphonse-Gaston routine of Congress and 
the Supreme Court in Dantzler and Giles left blacks with no rights 
57 that the white men of the national government were bound to protect. 
In another turn-of-the-century case, the Supreme Court used an 
extremely stringent intent criterion to slam the door on efforts to 
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mandate as much equality as was possible in a segregated system. If 
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion in Cumming v. Richmond County School 
Board, 175 U.S •. 528 (1899) had been precisely followed, it would have 
made it practically impossible to prove a constitutional violation 
against a prudent discriminator. In 1897, the Augusta, Georgia, 
school board, claiming financial stringency and a desire to use 
available moneys for black elementary education, had cut off funds for 
a black high school, while continuing to subsidize two high schools 
for whites. Pointing out that the school board had just received a 
very large increase in appropriations from the state government and 
that, if more money was needed for black elementary schools, it could 
come from the state supplement or from funds previously devoted to 
white as well as black schools, black parents charged that the school 
board's action was unconstitutional. But since school board members 
had not openly said that they acted because they wished to 
disadvantage black children, Justice Harlan treated their economic 
distress excuse as a "rational basis," and disregarded the view, 
strenuously pressed by one of the great constitutional lawyers of the 
day, former U. S. Senator George F. Edmunds, that the discriminatory 
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impact of the law should be considered dispositive as to its real 
intent. 59 
Although I am not a lawyer and do not claim to be"an expert on 
modern constitutional law, the trend in recent cases on voting rights 
discrimination appears to pose, even to a layman, disturbing parallels 
to the Supreme Court's post-Reconstruction restriction of 
constitutional protection of minority rights. Although it denied the 
requested relief in the first multimember districting case, Fortson v. 
Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965), the Court did proclaim a generous and 
perhaps even workable standard for proving a violation. Those who 
claimed that a multimember scheme disadvantaged "racial or political 
elements" of the popUlation could prevail if they could show that the 
scheme "designedly or otherwise" discriminated against them. 60 In 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), the Court denied that the 
lawyers for the Indianapolis blacks had proved either discriminatory 
intent or effect, but did not foreclose an attack on either ground. A 
general history of "bias and franchise dilution in the State's drawing 
of lines" was sufficient evidence of intent to convince the Supreme 
Court in Taylor v. HcKeithen, 407 U.s. 191 (1972), to overturn a 
southern redistricting scheme. White v.Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) 
held a Texas multimember scheme invalid on the basis of a "totality of 
the circumstances" approach which blended both "design and impact." 
And in Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971), the Court directed a 
federal district court to devise a reapportionment scheme which did 
not include multimember districts, pres~lably because it recognized 
the unfairness of such districts to minorities. 
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In related areas of equal protection law, the Court zig-
zagged. Palmer v. Thompson 403 U.S. 217 (1971), held that Jackson, 
Mississippi's decision to close its swimruing pools could not be 
reversed on the grounds of discriminatory motive, which was 
established in the record, alone. 61 Impact became the key element. 
Yet in a series of cases beginning with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229 (1976), the Court applied an ever stricter "motive test." 
Although he held that an equal protection violation "must ultimately 
be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose" in Washington, Hr. 
Justice White did rule that a disproportionate effect on minorities 
was "not irrelevant" to an inquiry into purpose and that intent was to 
be assessed by looking at the "totality of the relevant facts".62 In 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Hetropolitan Housing Development 
Corp., 97 S.Ct. 555 (1977), the court appears to have dismissed the 
discriminatory impact of the Chicago suburb's zoning ordinance on 
racial minorities as irrelevant to a deter~mination of motive, and it 
readily accepted the Village's non-racial.explanation for its action. 
An in Personnel Administrator of Hassachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 
256 (1979), impact became even less relevant to motive, since the 
court held that the challenged action had to be shown to have been 
taken "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its 
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.,,63 
These two streams flow together in Mobile v. Bolden, a 
confusing hodgepodge of opinions headed by Nr. Justice Stewart's for a 
four person plurality. Pushing Feeney further, Justice Stewart found 
impact largely irrelevant, dismissed the view that the failure of the 
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state of Alabama to take positive steps to remedy the historical 
pattern of past discrimination by itself constitutes a violation of 
the Constitution, and, according to one reading of the opinion, 
limited "the constitutional inquiry to a search for a smoking gun.,,64 
Like Cumming before it, Bolden is both a seal of approval on an unjust 
status quo and an invitation to engage in soft-pedaled discrimination, 
an announcement that a credulous court is ready to defer to any state 
and local authorities who can offer plausible reasons besides race for 
their actions. 65 Take away section 5 pre-clearance, or relax its 
heretofore fairly stringent controls, and ~ opens the door to 
widespread electoral changes, aimed at reducing minority political 
power, but adopted either so quietly or accompanied by such heated 
denials of any discriminatory purpose as to make the true motives 
difficult if not impossible to prove in court. 
It is difficult for a historian of nineteenth-century race 
relations to retain much optimism. Long and difficult crusades by men 
and women of good faith, black and white, a terribly bloody civil war, 
a constitutional revolution, a muted but meaningful post-
Reconstruction struggle by thousands of individuals to retain the 
advanced ground gained -- all this ended in something closer to defeat 
than to victory. As a nineteenth-century pessimist, let me then 
present you with a dreary scenario, which it is in your power to 
prevent. Congress, in a fit of optimism or conservatism, emasculates 
the Voting Rights Act, declaring, in effect, as Congress did with 
respect to disfranchisement in 1903, that the protection of minority 
political rights is a judicial question. States, cities, and towns 
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throughout the South and perhaps elsewhere where there are 
sufficiently large minority populations rush to adopt subtle forms of 
electoral discrimination. Liberal organizations respond with a spate 
of lawsuits, but have difficulty locating, the carefully hidden smoking, 
guns. The Supreme Court, bolstered by new members, either by 
demanding ultra-strict standards for proving motive or by declaring, 
Giles-like, the whole morass a "political question," offers no relief. 
The abridgement of minority voting rights becomes again a reality. In 
a very real sense, Congress, in facing the decision of whether to 
renew or to scuttle the Voting Rights Act, has the power to declare 
whether or not history -- for me, a terrible, nightmarish history --
will repeat itself. 
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